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Back to Basics
Amid lively debate during the January 2010, NCAA Scholarly Colloquium about 
whether Division I athletics faces a financial “crisis”, there emerged a consensus 
that Division I collectively at least has reached, in Prof. Zimbalist’s word, a “cross-
road” (Zimbalist, 2010). This paper argues that before choosing any particular route 
away from this intersection, there first should be a clear destination: an approach 
that will provide long-term discipline to financing big-time athletics, rather than 
simply change balance sheets in the short term without transforming the underly-
ing financial culture that has brought us here in the first place. Developing this 
framework also will provide an opportunity to reinforce an essential premise of 
funding intercollegiate athletics at the vast majority of American institutions: that 
it is appropriate to allocate general-purpose institutional funds in athletics when 
that investment is made in ways that are educationally and financially sound.
This new structure should rest on four principles:
• Institutions should commit to maintaining balanced budgets, without “emer-
gency” use of institutional funds beyond what those budgets contemplate 
initially.
• Conferences should commit to providing frameworks that will help their 
institutions meet these commitments.
• National athletic accounting standards should be complete, transparent and 
consistent across institutions, so that schools and conferences—and the public–
can measure and compare efforts and results in meaningful ways.
• Practical budgetary guidelines should be developed, so that schools and confer-
ences can translate their commitments into achievable working expectations.
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This paper will develop this approach in some detail, and then will consider 
Zimbalist’s proposal to ask Congress to exempt the operation of Division I foot-
ball from the federal antitrust laws, to enable collective regulation and limiting of 
coaches’ compensation. While there would be savings from his proposal to reduce 
the number of football grants-in-aid, and more revenue (with a potentially wider 
distribution) from his proposal to replace the football bowl system with a national 
championship structure, neither proposal is likely to advance the central goal of 
creating long-lasting financial discipline, as opposed to simply making bottom 
lines somewhat better in the short run.
A Congressional exemption, in contrast, would seem to guarantee at some 
degree of discipline, on the assumptions that the higher education community would 
use the exemption after going through the difficult process of securing it, and that 
Congress then would consistently review the effects of its legislation. As suggested 
later, seeking such an exemption will be a public and complicated process, and it’s 
likely that there will be only one chance to make that effort: even with a good long-
term framework in place, therefore, this proposal should command our attention.
As a final note of introduction, it should be acknowledged at the outset that no 
framework or principles, no matter how complete on paper, will result in real and 
lasting change unless the institutions that compete in Division I decide, at every 
relevant level, that they really want to achieve change—and that even then, change 
will depend on the resolution of significant differences within the Division I mem-
bership. The approach proposed here is thus certainly not sufficient in its own right.
At the same time, it seems manifest that a systematic approach is necessary, 
both to shape the debate that will be needed to resolve those differences, and 
because the evidence is overwhelming that without clearer expectations against 
which to measure institutional results, too many institutions will continue to make 
unrealistic financial decisions, with unfavorable financial results.
Preserving the Legitimacy of Institutional Funding
Zimbalist reinforces other recent analyses in suggesting that the core financial issues 
are in Division I football, the sport with the largest budgets2. It is often claimed 
that those large budgets are needed because “surplus” revenues from football are 
needed to underwrite much of the cost of sponsoring other sports. But the data 
seem to show instead that Division I football is at collective financial risk, as more 
schools spend increasingly more money on football but then do not meet their own 
budgetary goals, spend unbudgeted general funds to meet the resulting deficits, 
and claim that they cannot see how to break this cycle (Knight Commission on 
Intercollegiate Athletics, 2009a, 2009b).
This summary is not a criticism of the “revenue” model as such. It is an assertion 
that we should consider the model’s current results carefully and unsentimentally 
across all of Division I, and that we should change the culture of Division I so that 
the next decade’s financial trends show consistently balanced budgets rather than 
frequent insolvency3.
Certainly some Division schools do very well, competitively and financially, 
in any year, and some of those do very well every year. But by definition, each year 
about half the competitors in each subdivision of Division I football will perform 
badly on the field, which is not a sound basis for good long-term performance at 
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the bank. Only a comprehensive approach to financing will work for all schools 
over time, regardless of whether any one school is 10-and-2, or 2-and-10, in any 
particular autumn.
Yet we’ve been here before. In the first era of modern athletics “reform”, in 
the late 1970s, the financing and problems of big-time athletics were described 
almost exactly as many do today, with assertions that big-time football costs were 
out of control (especially coaches’ salaries), that big-time sports generally were 
divorced from institutions’ educational purposes, and that presidents could not 
respond except in some concerted way that they felt unable to develop4.
In the ensuing years, however, revenues in big-time athletics rose dramatically 
through the growth of cable television and the end of the NCAA football televi-
sion monopoly, the growth of conference and bowl football television revenues 
and NCAA and conference basketball tournaments and television revenues, and 
the emergence of sports sponsorship and marketing as a multibillion-dollar busi-
ness sector5. Conversely, the schools that play big-time football still are a distinct 
minority among American colleges and universities, and even on those campuses 
the dollars involved can be relatively small fractions of overall institutional budgets.
Why, then should Division I feel any special urgency to act now? And why 
should the larger higher education community, which inevitably would be affected 
by any approach to Congress for a legislative solution, consider involving itself in 
the financial troubles of these few schools, whose athletic programs after all receive 
the bulk of public attention and financial support, and who thus presumably should 
be able to find their own solutions6?
The confluence of three factors suggests a greater urgency now than three 
decades ago:
• The larger number of schools and dollar amounts involved mean that more 
schools are at more risk if the system stumbles. With few exceptions, growth 
in revenues has led not to athletic endowments and long-term stability, but 
rather to the accelerated trends of spending and deficits of recent years. And 
as Knight Commission on Athletics Co-Chair Gerald Turner noted during the 
Colloquium, the NCAA “certification” process, successful in other governance 
and academic areas, has had no apparent effect on finances.
• As the NCAA and various conference television packages come up for renewal 
in the next few years, however, there is substantial uncertainty across Divi-
sion I about the level and distribution of the core television revenue streams: 
whatever the success of leading conferences such as the Big 10 and SEC, it is 
unclear how much money will be available across Division I generally. And 
given the current financial strains within higher education, institutional “res-
cues” for faltering athletic programs are controversial at best and divisive at 
best, and demands only will increase for financial prudence, and for athletics 
to ameliorate overall institutional financial problems rather than aggravate 
them (Thelin, 2009a and 2009b).
• Finally, this system has developed in a period of increasing Congressional, 
judicial and media scrutiny of higher education, both athletically and generally, 
often about issues as to which Division I disagrees passionately (a national 
football playoff among them)7. And many faculty and other “reformers” who 
were relatively pleased with the past decade’s academic reforms in athletics 
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seem to have given up on the possibility of changing the finances of Division I 
athletics from within, and now may be interested in more radical change8. The 
athletic community will have more control over changes that it initiates than 
over “reform” that originates in Congress or otherwise is imposed externally.
Perhaps most importantly, precisely because Division I athletics are so visible, 
what happens in these programs ultimately shapes the public perception of all of 
collegiate athletics—and however indirectly, shapes the financial circumstances and 
trends that affect all of collegiate athletics, not just in football but across all sports. 
It is thus a bad thing for all of college athletics, at every level, when the institutions 
in Division I seem unable to fund athletics in a stable manner9.
Specifically: Higher education always has assumed that intercollegiate athletics 
costs more than it produces in revenue at virtually all schools, and that athletics 
potentially deserves institutional support at all schools, because athletics produces 
qualities that we want in our graduates, no matter what sport they play10. If public 
skepticism about the finances of big-time athletics means that allocating institutional 
funds to athletics is viewed as subsidizing profligate athletic departments, rather 
than as investing in students through athletics, then institutional funding of athletics 
as an educational activity is at risk in all sports, at all institutions.
The legitimacy of institutional funding for athletics will not be preserved unless 
we change the structure that has brought us to these circumstances, rather than 
seek simply to cut costs and/or to increase revenues. That is, before considering 
the kinds of specific proposals offered by Zimbalist and others, Division I athlet-
ics needs a financial approach that offers the potential for real discipline across all 
institutions: that provides explicit guidance for everyone involved—from trustees 
to faculty, from tuition-paying parents to athletic budget directors—as to how to 
do athletics financing well. Only with a cogent framework within which to apply 
a Congressional exemption, after all, can we know what to ask of Congress in the 
first place, how to tell Congress why an exemption actually would be effective, and 
how then to demonstrate to Congress that it is being effective
None of this is to suggest eliminating“ commercialism” or “entrepreneurism” 
in athletics, which are and will remain present in some way in every institution–and 
not just in athletics at that11. Nor is it to mandate “one-size-fits all” funding models 
or institutional or conference strategies. Rather, we should provide good templates, 
for many diverse conferences and institutions, to structure and pay for athletics as a 
valued institutional activity, and to assure, as Prof. Makar noted during the NCAA 
Colloquium, that the brunt of financial risk does not fall on women’s sports or on 
so-called nonrevenue or Olympic men’s sports (Makar, 2010).
That is, we must define the elements of public, workable models that relate 
athletic activities, expenditure levels and funding sources to an institution’s educa-
tional mission, and that fit within an institution’s regular management and financial 
practices. Institutions and conferences then need to find specific approaches that 
will work for them over time, so that they do not exceed their anticipated needs for 
institutional support, whether those expectations are substantial or minimal—so that, 
in other words, schools will balance their budgets in the ways that they say they will.
This kind of discipline may require a new clarity about institutional intentions 
for athletic programs, and about whether those intentions are being met. But it also 
will provide a way to legitimately “claim victory” when an institution’s chosen 
Be Careful What You Wish For     129
financial principles actually are carried through—a welcome change from constant 
budget overruns (and from the bad publicity that accompanies them), as well as a 
basis for enlisting the kind of non-Division-I support, from across the broad higher 
education community, that would be needed for any approach to Congress.
Principles for Financial Discipline
The framework proposed here as a basis for Division I financial discipline has four 
elements. Two are matters of commitment: presidential commitments to maintain 
balanced athletic budgets, and conference commitments to promote financial disci-
pline across their members. And two are matters of technique: full and transparent 
accounting, so that institutional communities and the public generally can know 
how commitments are being kept, and a toolkit of measures for designing those 
commitments in the first place across more than 300 diverse Division I institutions.
A presidential commitment to balanced athletic budgets is the correct way to 
consider the issue that’s usually phrased as “whether institutional funds should be 
used to support athletics.” That is, as already noted, investing institutional funds is 
appropriate if the institution has sound internal reasons for doing so, and institu-
tions will vary in how they make that assessment12.
On the other hand, there appears to be no good reason for an athletic depart-
ment consistently to need more institutional funds than are budgeted—or for an 
institution consistently to supply them. It is that situation that leads to the use of 
institutional funds being portrayed not merely as “subsidies” but as “bailouts”, and it 
is the pattern of those situations that then calls into question the use of institutional 
funds for athletics at every level of competition.
Instead, athletic budgetary practices and outcomes, including the levels of 
institutional support, should turn out to be what an institution says they will be in 
the first place, so that an institution states appropriate expectations and then meets 
them, with consequences if there are consistent deficits. Consistently “missing the 
budget” skews overall institutional budgets and leads to disaffection with athletics: 
both are bad outcomes, and both can be avoided—and the validity of allocating 
institutional money to athletics can be affirmed—if institutions do what they say 
they will do in the first place.
This kind of accountability is of course not only what institutional presidents 
should undertake, but essentially what the Division I-A presidents implied that 
they would undertake when they initiated the 1990s “restructuring” that provided 
them with voting control over the entire NCAA: they now are “the NCAA”, and 
the financial responsibilities clearly are theirs. Yet it’s neither surprising nor unrea-
sonable, given the highly and visibly competitive nature of Division I athletics, for 
those same presidents now to indicate, in the recent Knight Commission survey, 
that it’s very difficult for them to act individually, and that they need ways to act 
collectively (Knight Commission, 2009b).
A second area of commitment, therefore, is for conferences to publicly set 
and enforce clear financial expectations among their members. Conferences are 
the vehicles through which institutions already act together, based on shared values 
and aspirations and in ways that reflect the great diversity of Division I athletics, 
without having to seek a national consensus. The members of every Division I 
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conference should be able to set guidelines for proper athletic financing within that 
conference, according to their own particular circumstances, and then to provide 
their own ways to assure that each conference member lives up to its commitments.
A pair of tools will be needed to help conferences, presidents, and athletic 
directors make and keep these commitments. As both the Knight Commission panel 
and Zimbalist discussed at the Colloquium, the first is clear and public accounting, 
consistent and complete across different kinds of institutions and including all rel-
evant areas such as debt service, student fees, tuition waivers, total compensation 
packages, and booster-group accounting. Only with full and comparable public 
data can institutions set realistic expectations for themselves, measure how well 
they meet those expectations, and use the experience of other institutions to inform 
both their planning and their practical efforts.
The second tool, which as of January 2010 was being considered by the Knight 
Foundation for a spring 2010 report, is a menu of financial definitions, measure-
ments, and presumptions that institutions and conferences can use to construct 
their expectations, based on their different missions and revenue and expenditure 
expectations. As is true in areas outside athletics, institutions will choose different 
measures and timeframes as benchmarks, and have different ways of responding to 
changed circumstances, whether helpful or challenging ones. But a common menu 
clearly will help institutions more effectively make and apply those choices, and 
compare their results to other institutions: “open books” will be more helpful if it’s 
clear that those books re presenting useful data in the first place.
Institutions and conferences will need to address a variety of questions to 
develop truly useful commitments and techniques; here are two examples.
• In choosing what revenue streams to rely on, institutions will differ as to 
the proper level and use of student fees, whether a baseline of institutional 
general-fund support is essential, and the degree to which athletics should be 
supported by external revenues. What will matter is not the specific choices 
that an institution or conference makes in these regards, but that the choices 
are clear and realistic, and that the chosen expectations then are met.
• That is, what will need to be the same across all conferences is the expecta-
tion that over time, institutions will have the discipline to meet the athletic 
budgetary goals that they establish for themselves, for their own institutional 
reasons, without extra or emergency institutional funding. Only then will it 
be clear that the athletics claim on tuition and other general-fund revenues is 
a legitimate one.
• As Prof. Toma summarized at the Colloquium (Toma, 2010), and as others 
have described in detail (Gould, 2003; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997), some 
institutions now engage in far more entrepreneurial and competitive practices 
outside athletics than do others, so that athletic financial practices that might 
seem over-the-top at some campuses are much more consistent with other 
institutions’ overall approaches13. Thus in assessing “commercial” practices 
in athletics we no longer can use the answer that seemed so obvious 30 years 
ago—“just apply the regular institutional financial standards to athletics”—not 
only because schools are so much more diverse in these respects, but because 
in many nonathletic areas, institutions aren’t yet satisfied with the policies 
they’ve worked out14,
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• Moreover, while competition for faculty members, for example, needn’t nec-
essarily have “winners and losers”—while all schools, in theory, can attract 
good faculty member even if some outspend others—athletic competition is 
by definition a zero-sum game: there will be competitive losers as well as win-
ners, and in turn they will have a harder time financing “success” even as they 
define it. Even at the most entrepreneurial institution, therefore, expectations 
for athletic revenues and funding will need to be tempered by the often harsh 
realities of the athletic marketplace.
Going to Washington
Assuming, then, that we do reach the financial “red zone”, Zimbalist has ably met 
the challenge of calling a potentially game-changing play. But even with a long-term 
approach to disciplined athletic financing in place, it will be a complicated and public 
process to determine whether to approach Congress, and with just what kind of request, 
and any such approach should reflect careful consideration of at least three questions.
• What should a legislative request encompass? It’s likely that there will be only 
one chance to get Congressional action, so that attempt needs to be complete 
and demonstrably effective. It should consider, for example, whether to address 
just coaches’ compensation, or also other big-ticket budget item such as recruit-
ing. And we should remember that what some observers might consider the 
most direct precedents for an antitrust exemption—in the major professional 
leagues—include overall salary caps and revenue-sharing, both of which will 
be problematic in Division I.
Nor would designing this request be simply a matter merely of assembling 
the right technical elements. Rather, any legislative proposal should specifically 
promote long-range, overall financial responsibility by reinforcing the elements of a 
disciplined approach, whether the four that I have identified or any others that may 
be used, so that we are not simply addressing short-term deficits but strengthening 
long-term accountability.
• What form of accountability will Congress request? It seems certain that Con-
gress will expect not simply periodic review of the effects of any exemption, 
but some means to assure that those effects actually will be positive.
For example, when Congressman McMillan proposed an antitrust exemption 
so that the NCAA could regulate television, in the 1990s, the legislation provided 
that if the NCAA did not take advantage of the exemption within a year, Congress 
automatically would consider direct legislative regulation. Could permission to 
regulate coaches’ salaries be met, analogously, with the expectation that the I.R.S. 
would have the right to determine if the resulting framework would be consistent 
with its “excess compensation” standards for highly-paid employees in tax-exempt 
entities? And would higher education then be willing to have those new precedents 
applied across campuses generally?
• The preceding question implies the final one: Would asking Congress to leg-
islate about athletics cross a threshold as to the likelihood of greater general 
Congressional regulation of higher education?
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Certainly Congress already can seek to legislate about higher education 
whenever it wants to, and after a half-century of accepting federal money and the 
rules that accompany it, there’s little basis for questioning such efforts. But one 
reason that higher education remains comparatively unregulated in many ways is 
that since the McCarthy-era hearings almost 60 years ago, the higher education 
community has made clear that it considers regulation to be potentially threatening 
to academic autonomy.
We should acknowledge that sometimes higher education has unduly resisted 
oversight that in the long run has clearly been appropriate. But in the main the 
academy’s relative autonomy has been crucial to the development of the unique 
American mix of public and private institutions, of every variety. Especially 
given the recent Congressional attention noted above, we should be satisfied that 
approaching Congress about the specific matter of athletic financing would not 
endanger that autonomy.
Prof. Zimbalist’s paper effectively lays out the reasons for addressing the 
financing of Division I athletics and a potentially dramatic way to do so through 
Congressional action. I hope this paper has provided a useful perspective on the 
more fundamental structural changes that will be needed to make such an initia-
tive truly effective in the long run. As I write this article in January 2010, I will 
be curious to see how developments between now, and its publication six months 
later, will affect how the reader views what both of us have written.
Notes
1. Jeffrey Orleans was Executive Director of the Ivy League from 1984 to 2009 and is cur-
rently a consultant to the Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics. The views 
expressed in this paper are entirely his own.
2. The text will refer to “Division I athletics” rather than to the “Football Bowl Subdivision” 
(formerly Division I-A) or only to football within Division I. While trends differ somewhat across 
the three Division I subdivisions, and between football on the one hand and men’s and women’s 
basketball and other sports on the other, the issues and the needed changes are substantially the 
same across all of Division I, and as a practical matter the proposed model would (and should) 
apply across all of Division I.
3. Similarly, the level of coaches’ compensation is addressed here as a key element in rising 
overall costs, not as to whether that level is or is not “right” as a result of “market forces”, or in 
comparison with faculty or presidential compensation, or to the funds that student-athletes may 
receive as athletic “grants-in-aid”.
4. See the essays collected in Massengale, 1979; cf. Atwell, et al., 1980, p. 13: “The athletics 
governing bodies have not acted in any significant ways to control costs because the ‘haves’ in 
the system do not want to risk losing their competitive advantages to the ‘have-nots.’ . . . .The 
solution to the impending financial dilemma is not the elimination of the semipro [sic] model but, 
rather, controlling it so that it continues to benefit institutions without driving them to bankruptcy. 
The only hope for such a solution is that athletics governing bodies act at the earliest moment 
to control semipro athletics. However, precedent does not suggest that such control is likely to 
occur.”
5. Former UNC-Chapel Hill men’s basketball coach Dean Smith has put it succinctly: “’Bur-
geoning commercialization’ was born on the very same day that college presidents, athletic 
directory, and conference commissioners invited television on campus to show our games in 
exchange for a huge amount of money.” (Smith, 2002, p. 326).
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6. The extreme theoretical argument for not engaging these issues is that “the rich schools 
always will pay something to assure that the poorer schools survive, so they will have schools to 
beat.” Even assuming that to be true, it still would not be an efficient way to structure athletics, 
for either group of schools–and in any event a majority of Division I schools–likely would argue 
that major-conference bowl and television revenues, and NCAA “basketball” revenues, simply 
aren’t distributed that widely across all of the Division.
7. A partial list of athletic matters that have been the subject of recent or proposed legislative 
or judicial scrutiny includes whether coaches’ compensation levels violate I.R.S. guidelines for 
tax-exempt organizations, the overall tax-exempt status of intercollegiate athletics revenues, 
whether restrictions on salary levels for part-time coaches and grant-in-aid levels for student-
athletes violate the antitrust laws, and whether the Bowl Championship structure violates those 
laws (Jenkins, 2009). The most emphatic and continuing scrutiny of nonathletic matters has 
been Senator Charles Grassley’s concern with “pay-out” percentages from the largest university 
endowments (Lewin, 2010).
8. “In the realm of higher education reform, intercollegiate athletics is the one that got away – 
permanently. . . . Is reform necessary?–yes. Is it possible – no . . . . The best higher education can 
hope for is that eventually universities will cut loose their programs in football and basketball, 
making the university a sponsor rather than an owner of the enterprise.” (Zemsky, 2009).
9. Financially-based questions become even more pointed when accompanied by questions 
about “off-the-field (or court)” behavior of “big-time” athletes. Bad conduct is certainly unrepre-
sentative of all football student-athletes, and of all athletes generally, but it’s very visible, and it 
skews how the public generally—and faculty, very specifically–view athletes and athletics even 
at non “big-time” institutions.
The public apparently will continue to support huge public subsidies to construct arenas 
for privately owned professional baseball, basketball and football teams even when athletes in 
those sports “misbehave”. But—partly because college sports portrays itself as having different 
and more “non-commercial” goals–the public may not continue to subsidize college athletics at 
recent levels if the endeavor doesn’t seem to be managed well, and its revenues don’t seem to 
be allocated fairly.
10. Former Harvard University President Derek Bok unintentionally described the qualities that 
we might hope are provided by athletic participation when he noted that “when business leaders 
describe what they most need from the young managers and engineers they employ, they regularly 
stress not only strong communications skills and an ability to think critically and solve problems, 
but also a capacity to collaborate with others and work with diverse populations, a sensitivity to 
ethical problems, [and] a strong self-discipline. . . . .” (Bok, 2006, p. 305).
11. A better question than whether “commercial” practices will continue to be used to gener-
ate athletics revenue is how Division I can better define the relationship between the financial 
support permitted for student-athletes in the “revenue-producing” sports and the huge amounts 
of revenue that their competitions produce, especially by abandoning a focus on “amateurism” 
that is no longer very clear or precise. As the late Prof. Stanton Wheeler put it, “. . . the ultimate 
irony [is that t]he more the NCAA earns in television and other profits, the more it argues that 
the product is amateur athletics: To pay the athletes would destroy the uniqueness of the product. 
So the only way to make the billions of dollars now generated by varsity athletic programs is to 
protect the athletes from receiving any of it.” (Wheeler, 2004, p. 217).
12. In Divisions II and III, for example, substantial investments of institutional funds are unques-
tionably essential, and are not viewed as “subsidies” any more than are similar investments in 
academic departments whose “revenues” clearly will not pay their full costs. Even in Division I, 
most institutions expect that some such funds will be necessary, with the amount varying accord-
ing to the institution’s funding philosophy and athletic revenue expectations.
13. A sample of nonathletic practices resembling athletic approaches that have been criticized as 
overly “commercial” or “entrepreneurial” would include bonuses for presidents and/or development 
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offices if institutions meet certain fund-raising goals, substantial and highly personalized compensa-
tion schemes to attract or retain faculty or senior administrators, “bells and whistles “ competition in 
building ornate student unions, and aggressive student recruitment through use of “merit” aid and/
or Early Decision programs.
14. See, e.g., the discussion of medical-center conflict-of-interest rules for service on outside 
boards, especially of pharmaceutical companies, in Wilson, 2010.
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